

A-1: Additional information on the firm-level dataset

Firm-level statistics have been gathered by Statistics Denmark in several ways. All firms with more than 50 employees or with profits higher than a given threshold have been surveyed directly. The other firms are recorded in accordance with a stratified sample strategy. The surveyed firms can choose whether to submit their annual accounts and other specifications or complete a questionnaire. To facilitate responses, the questions are formulated similarly to those in the Danish annual accounts legislation. The final sample includes the following industries: the manufacturing of food, beverages and tobacco; the manufacturing of textiles and leather; the manufacturing of wood products and printing; the manufacturing of chemicals and plastic products; the manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products; the manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products; the manufacturing of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; construction; the sale and repair of motor vehicles, the sale of automotive fuel; wholesale except for motor vehicles; the retail trade of food; department stores; the retail sale of pharmaceutical goods and cosmetic articles; the retail sale of clothing and footwear; other retail sale and repair work; hotels and restaurants; land transport and transport via pipelines; water transport; air transport; supporting transport activities; post and telecommunications; finance; insurance; activities auxiliary to finance; real estate activities; the renting of transport equipment and machinery; computer and computer-related activities; research and development; consultancy activities; and cleaning activities.

A-2: Exogeneity in the additive "two-way" worker-firm effects model à la Abowd et al. (1999)

The estimation of a wage regression à la Abowd et al. (1999) requires that the unobserved component of wages ε_{ijt} is mean independent of individual and firm fixed effects and time varying characteristics:

$$\mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{ijt} | X_{it}, Z_{jt}, \alpha_i, \psi_{j(i,t)}) = 0 \quad (1)$$


As suggested in Card et al. (2013) and Card et al. (2016), we empirically assess its plausibility by considering all possible cases in which this assumption may be violated. First, we consider the case of sorting based on the idiosyncratic employer-employee match component of wages. This type of sorting is problematic because workers are paid differently at each firm depending on the match component. Absent any match effect, the average wage gains and losses from moving from high to low wage firms are expected to be symmetric. The existence of match effects however, will tend to offset the losses associated with moving to a low wage firm. In the limit if all transitions are voluntary and selection is based only on the match component movers would experience no wage losses.

Following Card et al. (2013) and Card et al. (2016), we construct mean log coworkers wages for each person in each year. We assign each worker to a quartile of the coworkers wage distribution. We do it separately for men and women. In each year we then derive average wages of movers by quartiles. Movers are defined as those who move from one firm to the other and who can be observed for two consecutive years in both the sending and the receiving firm. Figure A1 and A2 below shows the average wage dynamics of workers who moved from a firm in the 1st or 4th quartile of the coworkers wage distribution. Similar to what found by the other studies, we find rather symmetric

wage losses and wage gains for workers moving from high to low paying firms and the opposite. We do not find big wage changes for workers moving across firms paying similar wages. This suggests that the sorting based on a match component is likely to play a minor role in our setting.

A second case in which the exogenous conditional mobility is violated is when mobility is related to unobserved and temporary firm specific shocks. In this case for example, workers might be more likely to leave firms that experience negative shocks to join those that experience positive shocks. As in other studies however, we fail to find evidence in the data of particular dips in the wages of leavers or exceptional growth in the wages of joiners (Figures A1 and A2). Finally a third problematic case might arise if mobility is related to unobserved temporary individual shocks. This is the case for example, if workers who are performing well earn higher wages in the sending firm and they move to high paying firms and those who are performing worse experience wage cuts prior to moving to low paying firms¹. Under this hypothesis, we would observe different trends prior to moving for workers who end up in high versus low paying firms. We do not find particularly different pre-trends for workers moving to high versus low paying firms (Figures A1 and A2), suggesting that temporary shocks have a small effect on mobility in our sample. All in all these findings seem to support the condition 1.


Figure A1: Wage Dynamics of Male Movers.



Source: Figure shows mean wages of male workers who changed jobs in 1996-2005 and held the preceding job for 2 or more years, and the new job for 2 or more years. Each job is classified into quartiles based on mean log wage of co-workers in the last year of the old job (for origin firm) and in the first year on the new job (for the destination firm).

¹This might be for example also the case when ability is slowly revealed overtime.

Figure A2: Wage Dynamics of Female Movers.



Source: Figure shows mean wages of female workers who changed jobs in 1996-2005 and held the preceding job for 2 or more years, and the new job for 2 or more years. Each job is classified into quartiles based on mean log wage of co-workers in the last year of the old job (for origin firm) and in the first year on the new job (for the destination firm).

Figure A3: Share of stayers aged 25-60, by gender and by reference year (1996, 2000, 2003).






Figure A4: Share of switchers aged 25-60, by gender and by reference year (1996, 2000, 2003).




Source: Statistics Denmark.



(a) Stayers (left panel) and switchers (right panel), by gender



(b) Stayers (left panel) and switchers (right panel), by gender and education.



(c) Stayers (left panel) and switchers (right panel), by gender and occupation.

Figure A5: Wage development of stayers and switchers aged 25-60. *Source:* Statistics Denmark.

Table A1: Mean of all the other dependent variables

Statistics of other dependent variables	Sample of switchers	
	Women	Men
Prob(TFP of current firm > TFP of previous firm by 5%)	0.433	0.423
Prob(TFP of current firm > TFP of previous firm by 10%)	0.424	0.413
Prob(va of current firm > va of previous firm by 5%)	0.388	0.415
Prob(va of current firm > va of previous firm by 10%)	0.471	0.446
Prob(profits of current firm PER WORKER > profits of previous firm PER WORKER by 5%)	0.411	0.403
Prob(profits of current firm PER WORKER > profits of previous firm PER WORKER by 10%)	0.396	0.387
Prob(AVERAGE profits of current firm > AVERAGE of profits previous firm by 5%)	0.401	0.397
Prob(AVERAGE profits of current firm > AVERAGE profits of previous firm by 10%)	0.348	0.361
Prob(PAST profits of current firm > PAST profits of previous firm by 5%)	0.444	0.431
Prob(PAST profits of current firm > PAST profits of previous firm by 10%)	0.432	0.419
Obs	124,366	290,030

Notes: All the dependent variables are expressed as time averages from 1995 to 2005.

Table A2: The descriptive statistics of the Danish workforce with no sample selection

Variables	Sample of switchers				Sample of stayers			
	Women		Men		Women		Men	
	Mean	S.d.	Mean	S.d.	Mean	S.d.	Mean	S.d.
log(wage_sending)	12.443	0.340	12.590	0.404	12.190	0.551	12.458	0.564
age	36.513	11.144	36.695	10.865	40.374	11.107	40.463	10.515
tenure	3.414	3.941	3.336	3.864	5.218	4.787	5.466	4.953
labour market experience	14.183	10.169	12.414	9.292	17.562	10.181	15.309	9.024
manager	0.033	0.179	0.013	0.113	0.043	0.203	0.015	0.120
middle manager	0.326	0.469	0.307	0.491	0.304	0.460	0.398	0.490
blue collar	0.641	0.480	0.680	0.494	0.653	0.476	0.587	0.492
with at least a child (0-3)	0.117	0.322	0.117	0.321	0.105	0.307	0.110	0.313
primary (1, if with primary education)	0.331	0.471	0.290	0.454	0.323	0.467	0.316	0.465
secondary (1, if with secondary and post-secondary education)	0.564	0.496	0.627	0.484	0.596	0.491	0.623	0.485
tertiary (1, if with tertiary education)	0.105	0.306	0.083	0.276	0.081	0.274	0.061	0.240
foreigner	0.051	0.221	0.046	0.210	0.050	0.217	0.044	0.205
familiar network (1, if father or mother is manager)	0.044	0.205	0.049	0.216	0.034	0.182	0.033	0.180
married or cohabitating	0.642	0.480	0.676	0.468	0.711	0.453	0.749	0.434
share of women in the sending firm	0.056	3.784	0.044	5.307	-	-	-	-
share of women in the current firm	0.069	4.335	0.059	5.870	0.009	0.015	0.017	0.023
sending firm size less than 50 employees	0.147	0.354	0.083	0.275	-	-	-	-
sending firm size between 51 and 100 employees	0.099	0.299	0.058	0.233	-	-	-	-
sending firm size more than 100 employees	0.754	0.431	0.860	0.347	-	-	-	-
current firm size less than 50 employees	0.152	0.359	0.084	0.277	0.082	0.274	0.059	0.236
current firm size between 51 and 100 employees	0.103	0.305	0.061	0.239	0.150	0.237	0.100	0.197
current firm size more than 100 employees	0.745	0.436	0.856	0.352	0.759	0.348	0.801	0.299
Obs	1,321,918		1,706,267		8,334,444		9,556,177	
Number of individuals	528,394		584,266		1,614,448		1,824,252	
Number of firms			69,222		106,299			

Notes: All the variables are averages from 1995 to 2005 and refer to the full sample, before merging with firms' accountings and including companies with fewer than 10 employees.

Table A3: Firm performance and female-friendliness

Log of profits per employee						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female friendly firm	0.162*** (0.014)	0.127*** (0.013)	0.121*** (0.013)			
Female sought firm				0.101*** (0.012)	0.076*** (0.011)	0.097*** (0.011)
N	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948
R-sq	0.114	0.155	0.190	0.112	0.154	0.190
Log of sales per employee						
Female friendly firm	0.102*** (0.007)	0.078*** (0.007)	0.087*** (0.006)			
Female sought firm				0.142*** (0.010)	0.115*** (0.010)	0.111*** (0.009)
N	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948
R-sq	0.174	0.240	0.293	0.308	0.343	0.375
Log of value-added per employee						
Female friendly firm	0.060*** (0.006)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.070*** (0.006)			
Female sought firm				0.080*** (0.009)	0.062*** (0.008)	0.082*** (0.008)
N	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948	64,948
R-sq	0.172	0.239	0.292	0.305	0.341	0.374

Notes: The dependent variable is alternatively the log of profits per employee, the log of sales per employee and the log of value-added per employee. All specifications include firm size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. Specifications (2) and (5) adds the capital stock per employee whereas specifications (3) and (6) include the capital stock per employee, the share of managers, of middle managers, of employees with secondary education, of employees with tertiary education and of female employees, average employees' tenure and work experience. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A4: Sorting models, estimations with alternative definitions of the dependent variable

	Aver. Profits				Past Profits				TFP			
	> 5%		> 10%		> 5%		> 10%		> 5%		> 10%	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
log(wage_sending)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.023*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.020*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.027*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.025*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)
age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
age2/1000	0.004 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.007** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)
tenure	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
tenure2/1000	-0.077*** (0.008)	-0.054*** (0.006)	-0.038*** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	-0.077*** (0.002)	-0.051*** (0.001)	-0.067*** (0.006)	-0.040*** (0.002)	-0.069*** (0.006)	-0.123*** (0.004)	-0.063*** (0.005)	-0.122*** (0.004)
percentage of white-collar women in sending firm	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
percentage of white-collar women in receiving firm	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
child	0.007*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
secondary	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)
tertiary	0.020*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.000)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.027*** (0.000)	0.021*** (0.000)	0.025*** (0.000)	0.021*** (0.000)
married	0.008*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
foreigner	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.001)
family network	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.009*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.000)
N	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030
R-sq	0.126	0.130	0.099	0.126	0.132	0.160	0.123	0.158	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.003
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]:	353.72; 0.000		681.75; 0.000		2450.55; 0.000		58645.10; 0.000		38241.69; 0.000		7994.15; 0.000	
$\alpha_{1women} = \alpha_{1men}$												

Notes: All specifications include experience and experience squared, sending firm fixed effects, size dummies of the receiving and sending firm, and year and occupational dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A5: Sorting models, estimations with alternative definitions of the dependent variable

	Profits per worker				Value added			
	Women > 5%	Men > 5%	Women > 10%	Men > 10%	Women > 5%	Men > 5%	Women > 10%	Men > 10%
log(wage_sending)	0.021*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.020*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.012*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
age	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
age2/1000	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.028*** (0.002)	0.003*** (0.000)	-0.030*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.002)	0.026*** (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)
tenure	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
tenure2/1000	-0.069*** (0.001)	-0.054*** (0.010)	-0.038*** (0.000)	-0.051*** (0.010)	-0.018*** (0.007)	0.050*** (0.004)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.053*** (0.004)
percentage of white-collar women in sending firm	0.000** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
percentage of white-collar women in receiving firm	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
child	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
secondary	0.000 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
tertiary	0.031*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.000)	0.032*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.000)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.000)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.000)
married	0.006** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.006** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
foreigner	-0.010*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.000)
family network	-0.001 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
N	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030	124,366	290,030
R-sq	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.217	0.283	0.215	0.283
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]:								
$\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	986.01; 0.000		604.06; 0.000		33032.35; 0.000		17985.33; 0.000	

Notes: All specifications include experience and experience squared, firm fixed effects, size dummies of the receiving and sending firm a full set of year and occupational dummies. The standard errors are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level are reported in parentheses. **Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, *at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A6: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women, results by other relevant types of transitions

	Transition without unemployment		All Transitions, including firm exit	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.013*** (0.001)
N	79,670	79,670	152,759	152,759
R ²	0.151	0.137	0.121	0.119
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
N	205,288	205,288	351,893	351,893
R ²	0.131	0.129	0.129	0.130
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	87.16; 0.000	236.44; 0.000	30.15; 0.000	17.95; 0.000
	Transition within the same industry		Transition to a different industry	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.025*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.010*** (0.000)
N	66,213	66,213	58,153	58,153
R ²	0.203	0.188	0.118	0.109
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
N	148,120	148,120	141,910	141,910
R ²	0.155	0.155	0.136	0.133
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	2486.92; 0.000	12616.96; 0.000	1409.70; 0.000	4428.06; 0.000

Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A7: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by age and for promotions to a managerial occupation

	Under 35 years	Between 35 and 50 years	More than 50 years
<i>Women</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
N	432,923	615,224	266,108
R ²	0.003	0.007	0.006
<i>Men</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.021*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.002)
N	806,975	1,272,698	673,919
R ²	0.007	0.019	0.025
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	212.69; 0.000	212.69; 0.000	69.32; 0.000

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a managerial occupation. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A8: Gender differences in sorting and promotions, results by age

Sorting in job transitions			
	Under 35 years	Between 35 and 50 years	More than 50 years
<i>Women</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.020*** (0.000)	0.019*** (0.005)
N	60,289	51,052	15,335
R ²	0.113	0.137	0.203
<i>Men</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.002)
N	130,451	120,984	42,6388
R ²	0.130	0.131	0.156
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	58.33; 0.000	321.64; 0.000	18.36; 0.000
Promotion			
	Under 35 years	Between 35 and 50 years	More than 50 years
<i>Women</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)
N	444,075	619,177	233,307
R ²	0.018	0.020	0.018
<i>Men</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.003)
N	823,517	1,277,564	596,934
R ²	0.016	0.025	0.038
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	7.68; 0.005	78.41; 0.000	232.05; 0.000
Promotion to managerial occupation			
	Under 35 years	Between 35 and 50 years	More than 50 years
<i>Women</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)
N	444,075	619,177	233,307
R ²	0.018	0.020	0.018
<i>Men</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.038*** (0.003)
N	823,517	1,277,564	596,934
R ²	0.016	0.025	0.038
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	7.68; 0.005	78.41; 0.000	232.05; 0.000

Notes: For job transitions, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker moves to a firm whose profits are at least 5% higher than those of the previous firm. For promotions, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if the worker is promoted to a better occupational level in the same firm, or if the worker is promoted to a managerial occupational level in the same firm, respectively. All specifications include the same controls as the regressions in Table ???. The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the sending firm and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the .10 level, **at the .05 level, and ***at the .01 level.

Table A9: Sorting in job-to-job transitions estimated separately for men and women, results on parenthood

	With child (0-3 years)		Without child (0-3 years)	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)
N	18,697	18,697	11,031	11,031
R ²	0.120	0.117	0.112	0.097
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
N	42,968	42,968	26,784	26,784
R ²	0.126	0.130	0.119	0.117
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	29.20; 0.000	72.21; 0.000	105.52; 0.000	128.49; 0.000
	Before child (0-3 years)		After child (0-3 years)	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.025*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.000)	0.018*** (0.000)	0.018*** (0.000)
N	5,870	5,870	11,135	11,135
R ²	0.109	0.107	0.109	0.104
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)
N	12,667	12,667	27,196	20,642
R ²	0.129	0.126	0.120	0.119
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	132.60; 0.000	251.98; 0.000	19.19; 0.000	15.28; 0.000

Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A10: Promotion to better occupation models estimated separately for men and women, results on parenthood

	With child (0-3 years)	Without child (0-3 years)
<i>Women</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.003)
N	159,462	1,154,793
R^2	0.020	0.024
<i>Men</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.065*** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.001)
N	339,113	2,414,479
R^2	0.030	0.030
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	351.52; 0.000	174.04; 0.000
	Before Child (0-3 years)	After Child (0-3 years)
<i>Women</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.036** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.001)
N	76,813	144,496
R^2	0.027	0.018
<i>Men</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.052*** (0.002)	0.052*** (0.001)
N	169,870	303,364
R^2	0.031	0.019
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	80.45; 0.000	279.81; 0.000

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A11: Sorting models estimated separately for men and women, results by occupation and education

	Blue-collar		Middle manager		Manager	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.027*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.009)
N	88,987	88,987	32,256	32,256	3,123	3,123
R ²	0.138	0.125	0.108	0.101	0.150	0.144
<i>Men</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
N	208,474	208,474	69,426	69,426	12,130	12,130
R ²	0.144	0.143	0.099	0.097	0.109	0.108
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	756.10; 0.000	59625.81; 0.000	2.47; 0.116	172.47; 0.000	159.04; 0.000	2.47; 0.116
	Primary education		Secondary education		Tertiary education	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.032*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
N	45,801	45,801	69,744	69,744	8,821	8,821
R ²	0.155	0.143	0.115	0.105	0.107	0.103
<i>Men</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.006** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)
N	87,299	87,299	186,887	186,887	15,844	15,844
R ²	0.158	0.156	0.124	0.123	0.112	0.108
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	25.75; 0.000	23.55; 0.000	7852.27; 0.000	545.36; 0.000	0.13; 0.715	24.95; 0.000

Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A12: Sorting models estimated separately for men and women, results by relevant individual characteristics

	With family network		Without family network	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.054*** (0.003)	0.047*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)
N	6,096	6,096	118,270	118,270
R ²	0.113	0.104	0.127	0.125
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
N	11,754	11,754	278,276	278,276
R ²	0.115	0.108	0.131	0.130
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	21794.56; 0.000	1214.00; 0.000	252.63; 0.000	329.23; 0.000
	Married or cohabiting		Single	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)
N	92,378	92,378	31,988	31,988
R ²	0.130	0.119	0.117	0.107
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)
N	212,851	212,851	77,179	77,197
R ²	0.129	0.128	0.134	0.132
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	16048.29; 0.000	3952.48; 0.000	13.65; 0.000	4.33; 0.037
	Transition without change in residence		From full to part-time	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.018*** (0.000)	0.016*** (0.000)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.021** (0.009)
N	49,655	49,655	2,739	2,739
R ²	0.104	0.097	0.114	0.117
<i>Men</i>				
log(wage_sending)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.002)
N	116,211	116,211	5,916	5,916
R ²	0.129	0.127	0.109	0.110
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	1349.07; 0.000	800.27; 0.000	5.34; 0.020	5.24; 0.022

Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A13: Sorting models estimated separately for men and women, results by the size of sending firm and the industry of the receiving firm

	Firm size: 20-49 employees		Firm size: 50-99 employees		Firm size: more than 99 employees	
	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%	Profits > 5%	Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)
N	17,350	17,350	13,858	13,858	93,158	93,158
R ²	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.026	0.026
<i>Men</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
N	54,602	54,602	40,272	40,272	195,156	195,156
R ²	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.054	0.049
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	433.62; 0.000	452.61; 0.000	8.26; 0.004	0.00; 0.982	3079.09; 0.000	26452.84; 0.0000
Manufacturing		Construction		Wholesale trade		
Profits > 5%		Profits > 10%		Profits > 5%		Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.022*** (0.000)	0.019*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.001)	0.016*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.000)
N	46,811	46,811	2,968	2,968	35,837	35,837
R ²	0.125	0.116	0.149	0.120	0.109	0.101
<i>Men</i>						
log(wage_sending)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.000)
N	121,213	121,213	47,085	47,085	54,228	54,228
R ²	0.136	0.134	0.148	0.151	0.114	0.110
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	3858.86; 0.000	18145.63; 0.000	57.35; 0.000	78.10; 0.000	2697.00; 0.000	2673.04; 0.000
Transport		Business and financial		All firms, including those with fewer than 20 employees		
Profits > 5%		Profits > 10%		Profits > 5%		Profits > 10%
<i>Women</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)
N	20,371	20,371	18,325	18,325	144,988	144,988
R ²	0.585	0.568	0.082	0.076	0.172	0.156
<i>Men</i>						
log(wage_sending)	0.008* (0.001)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)
N	37,640	37,640	29,357	29,357	356,331	356,331
R ²	0.440	0.440	0.083	0.080	0.191	0.187
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	0.26; 0.611	23.12; 0.000	0.25; 0.615	25.84; 0.000	1.4e+05; 0.000	1579.83; 0.000

Notes: All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, sending firm fixed effects, share of women, size dummies of the receiving and sending firms, and a full set of year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A14: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by education

	Promotion to Better Occupation		Promotion to Manager
	Primary education	Secondary education	Tertiary education
<i>Women</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.026*** (0.002)		0.039*** (0.002)
N	505,775		726,044
R ²	0.020		0.024
<i>Men</i>			
log(wage_sending)	0.045*** (0.002)		0.067*** (0.001)
N	807,046		1,799,420
R ²	0.022		0.032
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	850.91; 0.000		331.35; 0.000
			241.19; 0.000

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational level. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A15: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by industry of receiving firm and for promotions to better occupation

Promotion to Better Occupation			
	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale trade
	<i>Women</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.033*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.002)
N	701,240	41,726	316,488
R ²	0.020	0.032	0.031
	<i>Men</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.067*** (0.001)	0.061*** (0.003)	0.055*** (0.001)
N	1,536,147	357,660	477,131
R ²	0.029	0.027	0.045
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	205.81; 0.000	157.80; 0.000	309.58; 0.000
Promotion to Better Occupation			
	Transport	Business and financial	
	<i>Women</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.050*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.002)	
N	68,495	185,346	
R ²	0.026	0.016	
	<i>Men</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.036*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.002)	
N	155,961	220,576	
R ²	0.014	0.013	
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	19.60; 0.000	3.21; 0.073	

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational level within the same firm. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.

Table A16: Promotion models estimated separately for men and women, results by industry of receiving firm and for promotions to a managerial occupation

Promotion to Managerial Occupation			
	Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale trade
	<i>Women</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.006*** (0.000)	0.010** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)
N	701,240	41,726	316,488
R ²	0.007	0.009	0.005
	<i>Men</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
N	1,536,147	357,660	477,131
R ²	0.023	0.017	0.018
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	199.27; 0.000	174.71; 0.000	82.17; 0.000
Promotion to Managerial Occupation			
	Transport	Business and financial	
	<i>Women</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	
N	68,495	185,346	
R ²	0.002	0.004	
	<i>Men</i>		
log(wage_sending)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.001)	
N	155,961	220,576	
R ²	0.002	0.005	
Hypothesis test [χ^2 ; p-value]: $\alpha_1^{women} = \alpha_1^{men}$	1.27; 0.2607	105.18; 0.000	

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one, if the worker is, within the same firm, promoted to a better occupational level within the same firm. All specifications include age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work experience, work experience squared, foreigner status, marital status, parental status, education, occupation, a family network dummy, firm fixed effects, receiving firm share of women, size dummies, and a full set of industry and year dummies. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the sending firm level and at the individual level. *Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, **at the 0.05 level, and ***at the 0.01 level.